We present the economic principles of water allocation and pricing in a schematic water economy representing a wide range of real world situations. The water policy has inter-and intra-temporal components. The first determines extractions from the naturally replenished sources, given the stochastic nature of recharge processes. The intra-temporal policy is concerned mainly with the allocating of the extracted and produced water among the end-users. The optimal water prices associated with the intra-temporal allocation task are derived. Implementation of the optimal policy is discussed.
Introduction
Population growth and rising living standards have led to a rapid increase in the demand for water. The annual supply of renewable fresh water in any particular location, however, is on average constant. As a result, water has become scarce in many parts of the world. Adding the prevalence of deteriorating water quality and the increased awareness for water-related environmental and social problems helps to understand why water allocation has become a critical policy challenge. A water policy is concerned with efficient use of the existing water sources and a balanced planning and development of new sources. This work presents the underlying economic principles.
Water economies vary in many respects, including hydrology (water sources), precipitation, climate, physical infrastructure, water rights, and social institutions (see examples in Parker and Tsur 1997 , Dinar 2000 , Saleth and Dinar 2004 ) and a water policy must be tailored to the relevant conditions in each case. Our focus here is on the principles shared by many water policies, in spite of the idiosyncrasies of the water economy to which they are applied.
We begin by describing the components comprising water economies (Section 2) and continue to define feasible and optimal water allocation (Section 3).
A water policy consists of inter-and intra-temporal components. The first determines the limits on extractions from the naturally replenished sources, given the stochastic fluctuations caused by precipitation. The second (intratemporal) task deals with the allocation of the available water supply among the end-users. Our focus here is on the intra-temporal allocation decisions.
(The intertemporal problem is defined and briefly discussed in Appendix B.)
Once the components of a water policy have been laid out and the op-timal water allocation specified, the ultimate task of implementation arises and this task crucially depends on the idiosyncrasies of the water economy under consideration. In California's water economy, for example, the complex riparian-appropriative water rights system coupled with a variety of water permits (Parker 1997) limits the effectiveness of water pricing and promotes various trading schemes. In Israel, on the other hand, the water resources are owned by the state (Yaron 1997 ) and allocation policies rely on pricing and quota schemes. For such cases the optimal water prices (defined in Section 4) are necessary for implementing the optimal allocation policy and this form of regulation raises a variety of agency problems associated with asymmetric information, which are briefly discussed (Section 5).
We note at the outset that this effort does not pertain to survey the wide range of water allocation issues and no attempt is made to cover the huge literature on this topic. Moreover, it is clearly biased towards water economies in which pricing is an effective policy tool. With these qualifications in mind, we set to lay out the main principles of water allocation policies in a concise and coherent fashion and with a view towards actual implementations.
The water economy
A water economy consists of (i) the physical resource base (precipitation, rivers, lakes, aquifers), (ii) consumers and users (irrigators, households, industry), (iii) suppliers and the associated infrastructure (extraction-conveyancetreatment infrastructure), and (iv) regulatory and institutional infrastructure (water laws and property rights, prices and quotas, water institutions). We begin with a schematic description of these components.
Water resources
There are M (possibly interconnected) naturally replenished water sources (rivers, lakes, reservoirs, aquifers) whose stocks at time t are represented by Q t = (Q denoting the set of admissible extractions which depends on hydrological constraints.
Recharge at time t emanates from current precipitation and from subsurface flows. The latter depends on current and past precipitation. Precipitation may vary spatially across the water basin. Accordingly, we divide the basin into N ≥ 1 subregions and denote by w t the N −dimensional vector whose elements w n t are the precipitation in subregion n = 1, 2, ..., N during period t. The w t , t = 1, 2..., are i.i.d. draws from an N -dimensional distribution F w defined over a nonnegative support.
Current and past precipitations generate the M × 1 stochastic recharge effects of past precipitation. In view of (2.2), the water stocks evolution (2.1)
can be rendered as
. The extraction quotas g t+1 are restricted to lie in the admissible set
Two types of produced sources may also be available: desalinated water (of brackish sources or seawater) and recycled (treated sewage) water. We refer to desalination as source M + h, h = 1, 2, ..., H, where H is the number of desalination plants.
Recycled water has two distinctive features that separate it from the other sources. First, exogenous (health and environmental) regulations often require treating sewage water, disregarding whether it will later be reused. Second, the same regulations often forbid mixing treated effluent with potable water, implying that reusing the treated water requires separate conveyance and distribution systems. These properties affect the pricing of recycled water, discussed below.
Consumers and users
The basin contains S private sectors (urban, agriculture, industry) and a few public sectors (parks, estuaries, wilderness areas) scattered spatially in L locations (districts, regions, municipalities). We consider a single public sector, called the environment (e.g., instream water), indexed S + 1. location l demands the water quantity q. We assume stationary water demands; extensions needed to account for non-stationary effects (e.g., economic and demographic growth) will be discussed in the concluding section.
Agricultural (irrigation) demand
The number of agricultural sectors depends on the level of aggregation and may contain, for example, orchards, vegetables, fiber (cotton), cereals, other field crops and livestock. Agricultural sector s in location l has J activities (crops), indexed j = 1, 2, ..., J. Let y j (q) denote crop j's water-yield value function, not including the water cost.
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The corresponding inverse demand for irrigation water is given by y j (·) ≡ ∂y j (·)/∂q. To see this note that when the price of water is p w , profit is y j (q) − p w q and the water input that maximizes profit satisfies y j (q) = p w . Thus, the water demand at that price is y 
Industrial demand
Industrial sectors contain non-agricultural production activities that use water as an input of production. As above, the number of industrial sectors depends on the level of aggregation and the sectors are defined according to 2 These functions are defined as follows: Letỹ j (q, b, z) denote crop j production function, where q is water input, b is a vector of fixed inputs (e.g., land and family labor) and z is a vector of purchased inputs (labor, fertilizers, pesticides, machinery) with price vector r. Then, y j (q) = max z {p jỹ (q, z, b) − rz} s.t. b ≤b, where the output price p j , the fixed inputs constraintb and the input prices r are suppressed as arguments (see empirical estimation in Letey et al. 1985) .
how water is used in the production process. The inverse water demand of industrial sector s in location l, D sl (·), is derived in the same way as the agricultural water demand, with industrial activities instead of agricultural activities (see Renzetti 2002a , for a detailed analysis).
Residential demand
The utility of household i depends on the per-capita consumption of water (q) and other goods (z). The (per-member) demands forq andz are the outcome of 
and the corresponding inverse water demand is D
sl (·). The residential sector includes water use for human needs (including water consumed in service, public and commercial institutions) and private gardening (water use in public urban parks is included in the environmental sector, discussed below, due to its public-good feature). With some added complication, it is possible to consider private gardens as an additional residential sector (detailed accounts can be found in Baumann et al. 1998 , Renzetti 2002b ).
Environmental water
Environmental sectors include public urban parks and instream water in wilderness areas and estuaries. They differ from the sectors discussed above due to their public good features. We briefly outline how to incorporate environmental water, assuming for simplicity a single environmental sector indicated as sector E ≡ S + 1. Let q 
This WTP represents household i's demand for environmental water.
Estimating the WTP for environmental water belongs to the area of valuing natural amenities, on which a large (and growing) body of literature exists (see Freeman 2003, Bockstael and McConnell 2007 , for recent contributions).
Examples include Loomis et al. (1991) , Dudley and Scott (1997) and Xabadia et al. (2004) -the latter entails negative environmental effects.
Consumers (users) surplus
The gross surplus (not including the water cost) sector s in location l derives from consuming the water quantity q is 
and the surplus generated by q
Water supply
Water supply entails extraction-production, conveyance, treatment and distribution. Each activity requires capital, labor, energy and material inputs. The capital cost constitutes the bulk of the fixed cost (some labor costs, such as management and accounting, may also be independent of the water supply rate, hence included in the fixed cost), while the costs of the other inputs make up the variable cost. There is a large literature on the optimal design and management of water supply systems (see, e.g., Roumasset 1991, Chakravorty et al. 1995 ). Here we briefly discuss the various components, as they will later be used to formulate the optimal pricing rules.
Capital cost
The capital stock of each activity is measured in terms of the full cost of installing the infrastructure (pipes, pumps, canals etc.) necessary to carry out the activity. The notation used for the various capital stocks is presented in Table 1 . A capital stock determines the capacity of the associated supply activity, i.e., the maximal quantity of water that can be supplied during a year, but otherwise has no effect on the water supply rate. We denote these Sewage activity refers to the mandatory collection and treatment of water from urban and industrial sectors, disregarding whether the treated water will be reused later on. We denote by J sew the set of sectors that are connected to the sewage system. Typically the sewage infrastructure in location l (K l sew ) serves all sectors connected to the sewage system, i.e., all s ∈ J sew , hence is not sector-specific (the variable costs of sewage treatment do vary across sectorssee Table 2 below).
Recycling is the voluntary activity of reusing the treated sewage water, which requires further treatment, conveyance and distribution to end-users.
Some sectors (e.g., residential) are not allowed to use recycled water and we let J rec represent the set of all sectors that can use recycled water. Because recycled water cannot be mixed with drinking water, it requires a distribution system of its own. The recycling infrastructure, K sl rec , includes treatment, conveyance and distribution facility.
The annual cost of capital is the interest and depreciation on the (currentvalue) capital stock, which constitutes the bulk of the fixed cost of water supply. For example, with r and δ representing the interest and depreciation rates, respectively, the annual capital cost associated with extraction from source m is (r + δ)K m e .
Variable cost
The variable costs of supply are due to energy, labor and material inputs. per year from desalination plant h to sector s in location l is
with the obvious
. The current state of desalination technology leaves ample room for cost reduction due to technical change (see Tsur and Zemel 2000) .
Because mixing recycled with water derived from the other M + H sources is not allowed, recycled water requires conveyance and distribution systems of its own, which are included in the recycled capital K sl rec (Table 1) . The variable cost of recycled water supply at the rate a to sector s in location l is C sl rec (a).
Regulator
The regulator, or water authority, oversees and implements the water allocation policy defined next.
Water policy
At the beginning of year t, after the precipitation w t , hence recharge x t , has been realized, the water state Z t = (Q t , x t ) is observed (see (2.2)-(2.3)). Given Z t , the policy decisions for year t entail: (i) extraction quotas Burt (1964) and includes the works of Tsur (1990), Tsur and Graham-Tomasi (1991) , Provencher and Burt (1994) and Knapp and Olson (1995) . This area is still under-explored and the present effort does not change this state-of-affairs. Our focus here is on (ii) and (iii).
Water allocation
An annual (intratemporal) water allocation is defined in terms of q 1f) and
(total recycled water).
(3.1g)
Investment decisions
We consider a mature water economy for which the bulk of the capital (infrastructure, pumps, pipelines) has already been invested and the intratemporal capital decisions entail replacement of the depreciated capital and possibly investment in new capital to meet a growing demand. The decisions entail the investment rates in any of the capital stocks listed in Table 1 .
Feasible allocation
An annual water allocation is feasible if all the q msl components are nonneg-
(exogenous recycled water use restrictions), and the sub-aggregate allocations satisfy:
, ∀l (recycled to sl capacity) (3.2h) and
where α rec is the fraction of water loss due to sewage treatment and recycling.
The capital investments are nonnegative and cannot exceed some exogenous bounds (affordable expenditures):
and
where δ is the depreciation rate andĪ is the exogenous upper bound on investment. Constraints (3.2j)-(3.2k) apply to each capital stock in Table 1 .
Optimal allocation
An allocation generates the aggregate (gross) surplus
and inflicts the variable cost
and the capital cost (the interest and depreciation on the aggregate capital stock)
Net annual benefit equals the aggregate surplus minus the variable cost minus the capital cost. The optimal allocation is the feasible allocation that maximizes the net annual benefit.
The capital cost (3.5) ought to be explained. Recall that we consider a mature water economy -one in which the capital infrastructure has already reached a steady state (with a possible growth trend). Therefore, the cost of a capital stock K (recall that K measures the cost of installing the infrastructure at current prices) consists of the cost of financing K, i.e. the interest payment rK, plus the replacement cost δK due to depreciation.
Optimal pricing
We characterize the water prices that implement the optimal allocation for the private sectors s = 1, 2..., S, assuming the environmental allocations 
Extraction-production
The extracting firms pay (the regulator) an abstraction fee for each water unit (m 
Conveyance
The intermediate conveyance price is the marginal cost of conveying water from source m to location l: 
Treatment and distribution in location l
Upon reaching location l the water is treated and distributed to the various sectors. The marginal cost of this operation is
) (all derivatives evaluated at the optimal allocation). The first and second terms on the right-hand side of (4.3) represent the marginal cost of distribution to sector s in location l and may include also treatment costs if water is treated separately for sector s. The third and fourth terms represent cost of treatment before the water enters the distribution system. In locations that do not perform central treatment, the last two terms vanish.
Sewage
The prices considered so far are associated with supplying water from the various sources to end-users. The sewage of some sectors, i.e., s ∈ J 
Recycling
Recycling occurs when the treated sewage water is delivered to user sl, 
End-user prices
We turn now to formulate the optimal end-user prices. To that end, let I sl be the set of all water sources aside from recycling for which q msl > 0 under the optimal allocation: 
Supply stages and intermediate prices
The supply process can be viewed as proceeding along the following stages:
The extracting firms are restricted not to exceed the extraction allotments are defined in (4.8), (3.1b) and (3.1e), respectively. 
Regulation
Water economies are fraught with market failures, including increasing returns to scale associated in the supply infrastructure, common resources (e.g., aquifers and reservoirs shared by many users), supply and demand uncertainty due to stochastic precipitation, and external effects associated with environmental (in-stream) and irrigation (agricultural landscape) water. As a result, market mechanisms on their own are unlikely to yield efficient allocation (involving the water prices defined above) and some regulation is needed. It is helpful to distinguish between the regulation of supply and demand. The first determines the amount of water available annually by setting the extraction quotas from the M natural sources (i.e., g •sl . The second sum is used to cover cost of treatment, distribution and sewage collection in the location. The first sum is used to "buy" the water quantity q ••l from the conveyance firms, which is the same as buying that quantity at the price p l c .
water production (desalination and recycling). The second entails allocating this amount of water among the various users. Supply regulation is discussed in Appendix B. The remainder of this section deals with demand regulation.
Regulation may be direct, involving prices, quotas or a combination of the two, or indirect, based on a water market of some sort. Depending on the level of the regulatory body (state, region, county, district), it may be confined to intra-sectoral allocation, e.g., within an irrigation district or a municipality, or inter-sectoral allocation, e.g., between irrigation districts and municipalities.
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The policy tools available to the regulator, as well as the degrees of freedom in using each tool, vary from case to case according to the economic, cultural, political, institutional and legal structure (see Rausser and Zusman 1991 , Zusman 1997 , Dinar 2000 , Saleth and Dinar 2004 , Tsur et al. 2004 , Fischhendler and Zilberman 2005 , Griffin 2006 , and references they cite).
The set of policy tools feasible in any particular situation may evolve over time. This often happens when the increasing water demand (due, e.g., to population growth) exacerbates water scarcity and stresses the need for more efficient water allocation. A typical response is a move from allocation based on ad hoc arrangements, such as historical water rights, to more efficient allocation schemes involving water pricing and trading (Musgrave 2000 , McCann and Zilberman 2000 , Zilberman and Schoengold 2007 . In such cases the optimal prices, listed in Table 3 , are instrumental for regulation. Calculating these prices in actual practice requires information (on water demands and supply costs) rarely available to water authorities. The regulation task, it turns out, is greatly simplified under the special case of constant returns to scale supply technologies, giving rise to linear prices.
Linear prices
Suppose that the capacity and variable cost functions listed in Tables 1   and 2 are of the form C(a) = ca and F (K) = f K, where c and f are (scalar) parameters (each activity listed in Tables 1 and 2 has its own f and c parameters) . In such a case the marginal cost c equals the average cost independent of the supply rate, and the marginal capacity f equals water supply per unit capital independent of the capital stock. The optimal water prices (listed in Table 3 ), then, are independent of the water allocation and can be determined solely by the c and f parameters. Moreover, it can be shown that the water proceeds cover exactly the full cost (variable and fixed) of water supply (i.e., full cost recovery for water suppliers).
The regulator, however, is unlikely to know the true values of the c and f parameters. The information available to the regulator typically comes from activity reports (e.g., balance sheets) of water supply firms, giving rise to agency problems, such as when the firms, knowing that their reported information may be used against them (i.e., to determine efficient prices), are likely to misrepresent true costs. The literature offers a variety of methods to overcome or mitigate such problems (see Tirole 1986, 1993 , for relevant contributions). For example, by setting a price cap based on observed (reported) average costs with a period of gradual reduction to a target (lower) price. Firms that outperform the curve (i.e., become efficient faster) can keep the extra profits, while firms that trail the curve will be replaced.
When feasible, auctions should be used to choose the operating firms. For example, the choice of a desalination firm, or the firm to build and operate an irrigation project.
Linear prices as second-best regulation
The pervasiveness of scale economies in water supply technologies renders unlikely the linearity of the variable cost and capacity functions C(·) and F (·).
In such cases the average costs differ from the marginal costs and both vary with the water allocation. The task of calculating the optimal prices, then, requires information on the water demands of all end users and the supply costs of all supply firms and quickly becomes intractable. Moreover, aside from the information issue, under the optimal, marginal cost prices the water proceeds do not cover the full cost of water supply. Imposing the constraint that the water proceeds cover the supply cost, then, implies departure from the optimal, marginal cost pricing rule. The Ramsey rule (Ramsey 1927) specifies a departure that maximizes aggregate consumer surpluses subject to balanced supply budgets (see, e.g., Wilson 1993, Chapter 5) . This rule requires information on the demand elasticities of all sectors. Lacking this information, the regulator may resort to a simple average cost pricing, by setting the c's and f 's of the various prices at the associated average costs.
This simple average cost pricing rule entails full cost recovery (i.e., it balances the budgets of the supply firms) but is suboptimal to the Ramsey pricing rule.
Given the information limitation, it is viewed as second-best pricing.
Decentralized regulation
The pricing problems discussed above stem from the so-called asymmetric information -when consumers and suppliers have private information that they may not disclose (see Smith and Tsur 1997, Tsur 2000 , for water related discussions). Decentralization, namely delegating decisions to consumers and suppliers, is often an effective way to overcome or mitigate such problems.
Water markets are examples of decentralized mechanisms. Trading can be in water, in water rights or in water quotas, it may be formal or informal and it can be carried out within and between sectors (e.g., irrigation associations and urban districts) as well as within and between time periods (Howitt 1994) .
The wide range of observed market designs stem from the wide range of institutional, hydrological and physical setting affecting the operation of water markets (see Easter et al. 1998 , 1999 , Dudley 1999 , Zilberman and Schoengold 2005 , and references they cite). They all serve to alleviate problems associated with asymmetric information.
Concluding remarks
The above is a bare-bones account of basic principles of water allocation and pricing. Any real world situation presents a myriad of factors that limit the set of feasible policy tools and require departure from these basic principles.
Political and legal constraints have been briefly discussed. The asymmetric information problem has been discussed in Section 5. We close by mentioning additional, frequently encountered considerations.
Subsistence water Water for basic needs (drinking, cooking, hygiene) is considered by many as a human right to which all are entitled, disregarding supply costs or households' budget constraints. In actual practice this view is expressed via block-rate pricing of residential water, with a low (or even zero) price for the subsistence block (see Gleick 1996 , for basic water needs). General equilibrium considerations Our analysis is of a partial equilibrium type in that we assume that the rest of the economy is exogenous to the water economy. For example, we take perimetrically the price of capital (the interest rate r). Often, the water economy constitutes a substantial part of the entire economy, to the extent that the water policy may have feedback effects with a number of economy-wide variables, such as the price of capital and labor. In such cases economy-wide considerations can have significant ramifications on water regulation (see e.g. Tsur et al. 2004 , Diao et al. 2008 .
Implementation costs

Appendix
A Derivation of the optimal prices
Environmental water allocations are assumed exogenous and set at zero for convenience. We seek the water allocation {q msl } and the capital allocation
subject to the feasibility constraints (3.2), exogenous constraints regarding water quality (affecting treatment requirement and recycled water allocation) and nonnegativity of the water allocations, given the previous year capital stocks (the sub-aggregate allocations are specified in (3.1)).
Notice that, given the previous year capital stocks, the capital decisions entail only this year investments. Notice also that it cannot be optimal to plan idle capacity in any of the capital stocks (since it increases the cost without any benefit compensations). In actual practice, the extraction allotments g t = (g 
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We solve (A.1) for an average year in which g t =ḡ, so (3.2b) are binding and (3.2a) represents the same constraints as (3.2b), hence can be ignored. We also assume that (3.2j)-(3.2k) are nonbinding.
We use the following notation: is the shadow price of (3.2h). We assume that (3.2i) is not binding. 7 The optimalḡ according to which the extraction capital stocks are determined must be specified within an intertemporal decision problem and will not be pursued here. 
B Optimal extraction
The water state at period t is represented by From (2.2) we learn that, given x t = x, the density of x t+1 evaluated atx is f ξ (x − Γx), where ξ ≡ Λw and f ξ is the pdf of ξ induced by the pdf of w, f w . Then, the pdf of Z t+1 , conditional on Z t = Z and g t+1 = g, evaluated at
Z ≡ (Q,x) can be specified as
f (Z|Z, g) is the transition density of the state process.
Let B(Z t−1 , g t ) denote year t's annual net benefit, where the dependence on Z t−1 comes from the feasibility restriction g t ∈ A(Z t−1 ). technologies (Puterman 2005 , is useful for this task)..
